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Introduction
Multi-Agent Systems (MAS):
agents with imperfect knowledge
perform actions
in order to achieve goals
philosophical logic/KR view:
what are the main concepts?
what properties do they have?
how do they relate?
formal, logical analysis
⇒ logics of action and knowledge
⇒ extensions of propositional logic by modal operators
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Introduction: modal operators of knowledge
knowledge of individual i ∈ Agt :
Kiϕ = “agent i knows that ϕ”
knowledge of group J ⊆ Agt :
EKJϕ = “it is shared knowledge in J that ϕ”
= “every agent in J knows that ϕ”
CKJϕ = “it is common knowledge in J that ϕ”
= EKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJEKJϕ ∧ · · · ”
DKJϕ = “it is distributed knowledge in J that ϕ”
= “if each agent in J tells all he knows to J then CKJϕ”
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Introduction: modal operators of action and ability
nonstrategic (ceteris paribus)
〈pi〉ϕ = “there is an execution of program pi after which ϕ”
〈J〉ϕ = “coalition J can achieve ϕ (while opponents don’t act)”
strategic (‘ceteris agentis’,‘ceteris mutandis’)
〈〈J〉〉ϕ = “coalition J can achieve ϕ (whatever opponents do)”
StitJ ϕ = “coalition J achieves ϕ (whatever opponents do)”
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Introduction: the grid of MAS logics
aim of talk: overview the main MAS logics and highlight
problematic points
KR point of view: which logical language?
semantic-free
the grid of MAS logics:
S5C PALC ATELC
S5 PAL ATEL
no uncertainty PDL, CL-PC ATL
knowledge
upslope
action
no actions nonstrategic strategic
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Outline
1 No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions
2 No uncertainty, strategic actions
3 Individual knowledge, no actions
4 Individual knowledge, nonstrategic actions
5 Individual knowledge, strategic actions
6 Group knowledge, no actions
7 Group knowledge, nonstrategic actions
8 Group knowledge, strategic actions
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No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions: PDL
language of Propositional Dynamic Logic PDL:
〈pi〉ϕ = “there exists a possible execution of pi after which ϕ”
[pi]ϕ = “for every possible execution of pi. . . ”
where pi is a program (alias complex action):
pi F a | pi; pi | pi ∪ pi | pi∗ | ϕ?
⇒ “while ϕ do pi” = (ϕ?; pi)∗;¬ϕ?
in focus: reasoning about action/program effects
(ActionTheory ∧ Init)→ 〈a1; · · · ; an〉Goal
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No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions: PDL
PDL action theories must be augmented by frame axioms
BlockRed → [moveBlockL1,L2 ]BlockRed
⇒ PDL doesn’t solve the frame problem [McCarthy & Hayes 1969]
a lot of dedicated logical formalisms
SitCalc, EventCalc, FluentCalc, A, B, C, C+, BC, separation logic, . . .
SitCalc basic action theories [Reiter 1991]:
∀x
(
[x]BlockRed ↔
(
x = paintRed ∨ (BlockRed ∧ x , paintBlue)
))
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DL-PA: a dialect of PDL solving the frame problem
Reiter’s basic action theories can be expressed in
Dynamic Logic of Propositional Assignments DL-PA
[van Ditmarsch, H & de Lima, JLC 2011]
atomic programs: assign propositional variables to formulas
BlockAtL1B⊥
successor state axioms become DL-PA programs:
moveBlock L1,L2 = (Free?;BlockAtL1B⊥;BlockAtL2B>)
hyp.: in ∀x
(
[x]p ↔ γp(x)
)
, if a < γp(x) then γp(a)↔ p
nice properties [Balbiani, H & Troquard, LICS 2013]
complexity of satisfiability just as PDL
model checking as complex as satisfiability checking
Kleene star eliminable
every formula reducible to a boolean formula
claim: DL-PA = Assembler language for logics of change. . .
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No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions: CL-PC
language of Coalition Logic of Propositional Control CL-PC:
〈J〉ϕ = “coalition J can achieve ϕ by modifying its variables
(while opponents don’t act)”
each propositional variable controlled by some agent;
action of i = change of some of i’s variables (cf. bool. games)
[van der Hoek & Wooldridge, AIJ 2005; JAIR 2010]
in focus: reasoning about nonstrategic (ceteris paribus) ability
(AbilityTheory ∧ Init)→ 〈{i1, . . . , in}〉Goal
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No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions: CL-PC
captures strategic ability
〈J〉[J¯]ϕ = “J can achieve ϕ whatever the opponents in J¯ do”
can be embedded into DL-PA:
〈i〉ϕ = 〈pii,ϕ〉ϕ
with pii,ϕ polynomial in ϕ [H et al., IJCAI 2011]
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Outline
1 No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions
2 No uncertainty, strategic actions
3 Individual knowledge, no actions
4 Individual knowledge, nonstrategic actions
5 Individual knowledge, strategic actions
6 Group knowledge, no actions
7 Group knowledge, nonstrategic actions
8 Group knowledge, strategic actions
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No uncertainty, strategic actions: ATL
language of Alternating-time Temporal Logic ATL:
〈〈J〉〉Xϕ = “the agents in J have a strategy such that
whatever the other agents do, next ϕ”
〈〈J〉〉Gϕ = “. . . , henceforth ϕ”
〈〈J〉〉ϕU ψ = “. . . , ϕ until ψ”
in focus: reasoning about the existence of strategies
(AbilityTheory ∧ Init)→ 〈〈{i1, . . . , in}〉〉Goal
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ATL: the problem of strategy revocability
problem: strategies can be canceled
〈〈i〉〉G
(
married ∧ 〈〈i〉〉X¬married
)
is satisfiable
⇒ reason: strategies are “unsung heroes” [van Benthem]
solution: commit to a strategy
ATL with irrevocable strategies [Ågotnes et al., TARK 2007]
ATL with strategy contexts [Brihaye et al., LFCS 2009]
make adoption and canceling of strategies explicit
undecidable [Troquard & Walther, JELIA 2012]
Strategy Logic (SL) [Mogavero et al., FSTTCS 2010]
uses strategy variables; undecidable
ATL with explicit strategies [Walther et al., TARK 2007]
〈〈{i}〉〉i:σG(married ∧ 〈〈{i}〉〉i:σX¬married)→ ⊥
more principled: commit to an action
ATLEA = ATL + Explicit Actions [H, Lorini & Walther, LORI 2013]
〈〈{i}〉〉i:staymarried∞G(married ∧ 〈〈{i}〉〉i:staymarried∞X¬married)→ ⊥
same complexity as ATL
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No uncertainty, strategic actions: STIT
language of Seeing-To-It-That Logic STIT
[Belnap et al. 2001; Horty 2001]
StitJ ϕ = “by following their current strategy
the agents in J guarantee that ϕ is true,
whatever the other agents do”
^ϕ = “it is historically possible that ϕ”
F ϕ = “...” (temporal operators)
in focus: reasoning about causality (‘agency’)
Cond → Stit{i1,...,in} Fact
reasoning about strategic ability à la ATL:
〈〈J〉〉Xψ = ^StitJ Xψ
satisfiability undecidable [H & Schwarzentruber, AiML 2008]
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Outline
1 No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions
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Individual knowledge , no actions
language of modal logic S5:
Kiϕ = “agent i knows that ϕ is true”
principles
Ki> (omniscience)
(Kiϕ ∧ Ki(ϕ→ ψ))→ Kiψ (omniscience)
Kiϕ→ ϕ (knowledge implies truth)
Kiϕ→ KiKiϕ (positive introspection)
¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ (negative introspection)
“the” logic of knowledge?
generally adopted in AI
but. . .
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Individual knowledge , no actions
negative introspection axiom ¬Kiϕ→ Ki¬Kiϕ too strong
[Lenzen 1978, Voorbraak 1993]
1 suppose BiKip
i strongly believes to know p
should not imply Kip
2 suppose ¬p
3 then ¬Kip (knowledge implies truth)
4 then Ki¬Kip (neg. introspection)
5 then Bi¬Kip (knowledge implies belief)
6 ⊥ (belief consistent)
⇒ (BiKip ∧ ¬p)→ ⊥ ?!?
logic of knowledge should rather be S4.2 [Lenzen 1978]
⇒ dynamic epistemic logics get more involved. . .
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Individual knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
PAL
Public Announcement Logic PAL
〈ψ!〉ϕ = “the truthful public announcement of ψ can be made
and ϕ will be true afterwards”
reduction axioms (aka regression):
〈ψ!〉p ↔ ψ ∧ p facts don’t change (epistemic change only)
〈ψ!〉Kiϕ↔ ψ ∧ Ki[ψ!]ϕ
complexity of satisfiability:
same as underlying epistemic logic [Lutz, AAMAS 2006]
but more succinct [French et al., IJCAI 2011]
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Individual knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
the problem of closure under updates in PAL
most papers choose S5 as the logic of knowledge
others adopt K for generality
S5-based PAL ‘works’ because the set of S5 models is closed
under updates by announcements
holds also in modal logic K
fails in logic of belief KD45 and in logic of knowledge S4.2
[Balbiani, van Ditmarsch & H, AiML 2012]
reason: confluence node may be eliminated by update
{p} R //OO
R
∅OO
R
{p}OO
R
{p}
R
// {p}
p!
=⇒ {p}
R
// {p}
similar problem with other modal logics
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Individual knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
variants of PAL
DEL = Dynamic Epistemic Logic [Baltag & Moss, Synthese 2004]
agents perceive events only incompletely
⇒ event models
GAL = PAL plus Group announcements [Ågotnes et al. 2010]
〈J〉ϕ = “J can achieve ϕ by announcing some known formulas”
⇒ cf. ATL, CL
APAL = PAL plus Arbitrary announcements
[Balbiani et al., RSL 2008]
〈!〉ϕ = “there is a ψ such that 〈ψ!〉ϕ”
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Individual knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
the problem of uniform choices in APAL
You don’t see B ’s and C ’s cards, and they only see their cards.
Among the ace of spades and the ace of clubs, B has one
and C has one, but You don’t know who has which.
You want agent B to know both Spades and Clubs, but not C.
Is there a public announcement doing the job?
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Individual knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
the problem of uniform choices in APAL
B C
or
B C
in S5:
Init = KYSpades ∧ KYClubs ∧ KY
(
(KBSpades ∧ ¬KCSpades) ∨
= KYSpades ∧ KYClubs ∧ KY
(
(KBClubs ∧ ¬KCClubs)
)
Goal = KB(Spades ∧ Clubs) ∧ ¬KC(Spades ∧ Clubs)
provable in PAL:
(KBSpades ∧ ¬KCSpades)→ 〈Spades→Clubs!〉Goal
(KBClubs ∧ ¬KCClubs)→ 〈Clubs→Spades!〉Goal
so Init → KY 〈∃!〉Goal, . . . but you don’t know what to say!
in Group Announcement Logic GAL:
KY 〈{Y }〉ϕ vs. 〈{Y }〉KYϕ
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Individual knowledge , strategic actions
Alternating-time Temporal Epistemic Logic ATEL
[van der Hoek & Wooldridge, Studia Logica 2003]
〈〈J〉〉ϕ = “coalition J can achieve ϕ (whatever opponents do)”
Kiϕ = “agent i ∈ Agt knows that ϕ”
problem of uniform strategies [Schobbens, ENTCS 2004]
same as problem of uniform choice for APAL, v.s.
Ki〈〈i〉〉XsafeOpen
solution in ATELEA = ATEL with Explicit Actions
Ki〈〈i〉〉i:dial1234XsafeOpen
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Group knowledge , no actions
S5C = S5 plus Common knowledge
CKJϕ = “it is common knowledge in J ⊆ Agt that ϕ”
= EKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJϕ ∧ EKJEKJEKJϕ ∧ · · ·
fixpoint axiom:
CKJϕ↔ EKJ(ϕ ∧ CKJϕ)
induction axiom:(
ϕ ∧ CKJ(ϕ→ EKJϕ)
)
→ CKJϕ
⇒ will be criticized in the next section
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Group knowledge , nonstrategic actions
PALC = PAL plus Common knowledge
semantics: same as PAL
accessibility relation for CKJ = greatest fixpoint of EKJ relation
⇒ ‘rebuilt’ after each update
⇒ no reduction axioms for CKJ :
|= CKJ[ψ!]ϕ→ [ψ!]CKJϕ
6|= [ψ!]CKJϕ→ (¬ψ ∨ CKJ[ψ!]ϕ)
⇒ common knowledge may ‘pop up’ in an unforeseeable way!
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Group knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
the ignorant compatriots
Agents B and C are both Italian and don’t know each other.
They meet during the coffee break and start to talk in English.
Init = KB ITB ∧ CK{B ,C}(ITB → KB ITB) ∧ (¬ITB → KB¬ITB) ∧
KC ITC ∧ CK{B ,C}(ITC → KC ITC) ∧ (¬ITC → KC¬ITC)
1 first scenario:
a third agent truthfully says: “Hey, you are both Italian!”
Init → 〈ITB∧ITC !〉CK{B ,C}(ITB∧ITC)
2 second scenario:
a third agent truthfully says: “Hey, you are compatriots!”
Init → 〈ITB↔ITC !〉CK{B ,C}(ITB∧ITC)
[Lorini & H, 2013]
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Init = KB ITB ∧ CK{B ,C}(ITB → KB ITB) ∧ (¬ITB → KB¬ITB) ∧
KC ITC ∧ CK{B ,C}(ITC → KC ITC) ∧ (¬ITC → KC¬ITC)
1 first scenario:
a third agent truthfully says: “Hey, you are both Italian!”
Init → 〈ITB∧ITC !〉CK{B ,C}(ITB∧ITC)
2 second scenario:
a third agent truthfully says: “Hey, you are compatriots!”
Init → 〈ITB↔ITC !〉CK{B ,C}(ITB∧ITC)
[Lorini & H, 2013]
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Group knowledge , nonstrategic actions:
the ignorant compatriots, ctd.
After the announcement of ITB↔ITC , is it part of the common
ground of the conversation that ITB∧ITC???
implicit vs. explicit common knowledge
Init → 〈ITB↔ITC !〉
(
ICK{A ,B}(ITB∧ITC) ∧ ¬ECK{A ,B}(ITB∧ITC)
)
implicit common knowledge = PALC common knowledge
induction axiom: OK
reduction axiom: KO
explicit common knowledge: accessibility relation for ECKJ is
some fixpoint, but not necessarily the greatest
induction axiom: KO
reduction axiom: OK
[ψ!]ECKJϕ↔ (ψ→ ECKJ[ψ!]ϕ)
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Outline
1 No uncertainty, nonstrategic actions
2 No uncertainty, strategic actions
3 Individual knowledge, no actions
4 Individual knowledge, nonstrategic actions
5 Individual knowledge, strategic actions
6 Group knowledge, no actions
7 Group knowledge, nonstrategic actions
8 Group knowledge, strategic actions
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Group knowledge , strategic actions
ATELC = ATEL plus common knowledge
problem: which form of group knowledge required for
(uniform) group strategies?
sometimes distributed knowledge DKJϕ
sometimes shared knowledge EKJϕ
sometimes common knowledge CKJϕ
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Conclusion
S5C PALC ATELC
S5 PAL ATEL
no uncertainty PDL, CL-PC ATL
knowledge
upslope
action
no actions nonstrategic strategic
revisited logics for MAS and their problems
S5: inadequate as a logic of knowledge
S5C: questionable as the logic of common knowledge
APAL and ATEL: can’t talk about uniform strategies
ATL: commitment to strategies missing
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